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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2-
2(4). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly find that Appellant did not submit a written 
creditor claim to the Appellee Personal Representative within one year of the deceased's 
death as required under Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-803 and -804? Interpretation of a 
statute is a legal issue for which the standard of review is correction of error. In re 
V.K.S., 2003 UT App 13 ^  7, 63 P.3d 1284. 
2. Did the trial court properly approve the deed executed by the Personal 
Representative transferring property owned by the deceased prior to the marriage to his 
children, subject to Appellant's life estate, on the basis that the deed was consistent with 
the deceased's will and did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-703? Interpretation of a statute is a legal issue for which the standard of 
review is correction of error. In re V.K.S., 2003 UT App 13 at \ 7. 
3. Did the trial court properly rule that under paragraph 5 of the parties' Ante 
Nuptial Agreement, which states that "assets acquired by the parties" pass to the surviving 
spouse, Appellant was not entitled to a distribution equal to all income earned by the 
deceased during the marriage (including gifts he made to his children), but was instead 
entitled to a distribution of all property jointly held by Appellant and the deceased? 
1 
Interpretation of a contract is a legal issue for which the standard of review is correction 
of error. Howe v. Professional Manivest, Inc., 829 P.2d 160, 162 (Utah App. 1992). 
4. Did the trial court properly resolve Appellant's assertion that 1he Appellee 
Personal Representative waived the estate's rights to the deceased's personal property 
owned prior to the marriage by establishing a written waiver procedure, a procedure to 
which Appellant has not objected on appeal? The question of waiver is a mixed question 
of fact and law. "[W]hether the trial court employed the proper standard of waiver 
presents a legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events 
allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual 
determinations, to which we give a district court deference." Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 
UT541fl6,982P.2d572. 
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CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-703(1) 
A personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the standard of care applicable 
to trustees as described by Section 75-7-302. A personal representative is under a duty to 
settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any 
probated and effective will and this code and as expeditiously and efficiently as is 
consistent with the best interests of the estate. He shall use the authority conferred upon 
him by this code, the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to which he is 
party for the best interests of successors to the estate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(1), (3): 
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent, 
including claims of the state and any subdivision of it, whether due or to become due, 
absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal 
basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the 
personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented 
within the earlier of the following dates: 
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) for creditors who are 
given actual notice, and where notice is published, within the time provided in Subsection 
75-3-801(1) for all claims barred by publication. 
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the death of the 
decedent, including claims of the state and any of its subdivisions, whether due or to 
become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, 
or other legal basis are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs 
and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal representative within three 
months after performance by the personal representative is due; or 
(b) any other claim within the later of three months after it arises, or the time 
specified in Subsection (l)(a). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-804(1): 
Claims against a decedent's estate may be presented as follows: 
(a) The claimant may deliver or mail to the personal representative, or the 
personal representative's attorney of record, a written statement of the claim indicating ils 
basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed, or may file a written 
statement of the claim, in the form prescribed by rule, with the clerk of the court. The 
claim is deemed presented on either the receipt of the written statement of claim by the 
personal representative or the personal representative's attorney of record, or the filing of 
the claim with the court, whichever occurs first. If a claim is not yet due, the date when it 
will become due shall be stated. If the claim is contingent or unliquidated, the nature of 
the uncertainty shall be stated. If the claim is secured, the security shall be described. 
Failure to describe correctly the security, the nature of any uncertainly, and the due date 
of a claim not yet due does not invalidate the presentation made. 
(b) The claimant may commence a proceeding against the personal 
representative in any court where the personal representative may be subjected to 
jurisdiction to obtain payment of the claim against the estate, but the commencement of 
the proceeding must occur within the time limited for presenting the claim. Nfo 
presentation of claim is required in regard to matters claimed in proceedings against the 
decedent which were pending at the time of the decedent's death. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Barbara Uzelac ("Barbara") is the surviving spouse of the deceased, 
Louis J. Uzelac ("Lou"). Lou died on November 6, 1999. On February 4, 2002, Barbara 
filed a Complaint against Appellee, the Personal Representative of Lou's estate1 (the 
"Personal Representative") asserting various claims under the parties' Ante Nuptial 
Agreement. R. 984-85. Prior to trial, the trial court ruled, on the Personal 
Representative's motion, that (a) the Ante Nuptial Agreement was a valid and binding 
agreement (R. 139); (b) the Ante Nuptial Agreement created in Barbara a life estate in the 
residence located at 5559 and 5561 East Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah owned by 
Lou prior to his marriage to Barbara (R. 139-40); (c) Barbara's claims to elective share, 
homestead and family allowance were barred as untimely or due to their waiver in the 
Ante Nuptial Agreement (R. 198); (d) Barbara's claims to reimbursement of her civil 
service annuity discontinued during her marriage to Lou, COLA increases on the annuity 
as reinstated after Lou's death, health insurance and life insurance fail as a matter of law 
and undisputed fact (R. 837-38); and (e) Barbara was not entitled to a recapture of the 
amount of Lou's POD accounts that passed to his daughters outside of probate (R. 837-
38). The trial court also further ruled in a Minute Entry dated September 27, 2003 that 
lrThe original personal representative appointed under Lou's Will was Lou's brother 
Joseph G. Uzelac. R. 16. Mr. Uzelac passed away on November 20, 2003. R. 1244. Mr. 
Uzelac's son Joseph G. Uzelac, Jr. was appointed successor Personal Representative of 
Lou's estate on February 18, 2004. R. 1310. 
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the Personal Representative's distribution of the two parcels on which the Residence is 
located to Lou's daughters subject to Barbara's life estate (the "Deed"), was in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-703, Lou's Will and the Trial Court's previous 
ruling that Barbara held a life estate in the encumbered parcels. R. 1080-82. 
Trial on Barbara's remaining claims was held on October 7, 2003. At trial, 
Barbara asserted that she was a creditor of the estate—a position she had not asserted 
until she challenged the Deed shortly before trial—and sought damages in the amount of 
$293,320.09. R. 1141. Barbara's damages calculation was based on her assertion that she 
was entitled to a distribution equal to the amount of all income earned by Lou during the 
marriage. At the trial, the trial court ruled that Barbara, even if she were a creditor of the 
estate, failed to bring a timely creditor claim under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 and -804. 
R. 1303. In its April 6, 2004 Order following trial, the Irial court dismissed Barbara's 
Complaint with prejudice. R. 1347. The trial court ruled that based on the terms of the 
Ante Nuptial Agreement, the parties' intent stated therein, and the evidence of the parties' 
course of conduct during the marriage presented at trial, the Ante Nuptial Agreement's 
directive that on the death of the first spouse to die all properties "acquired by the parties" 
during the marriage pass to the survivor referred only to properties that were held by 
Barbara and Lou jointly at Lou's death. R. 1345-46. The trial court also ruled that 
Barbara's life estate in the Residence did not include personal property in the Residence 
owned by Lou prior to the marriage. R. 1346. In response to Barbara's objection that the 
6 
Personal Representative had waived the estate's rights in the personal property, the trial 
court, in a separate Minute Entry dated April 6, 2004, confirmed that the personal 
property in the Residence belonged to the estate, and directed that if the Personal 
Representative wished to waive any claim to this property he should do so by filing a 
written waiver with the court. R. 1349. The Personal Representative has not filed a 
waiver. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The deceased, Louis J. Uzelac ("Lou"), and Appellant Barbara Uzelac 
("Barbara") were married on April 14, 1976. At the time of their marriage, Lou was 60 
years old and Barbara was 49 years old. R. 1340-41. 
2. Lou's first wife Ruth died in January of 1974. R. 1341. 
3. Lou had two children from his marriage to Ruth: Allyson Uzelac and Susan 
Brooke (Uzelac) Mageras. R. 1341. 
4. Barbara's first husband Renold died in August of 1970. Barbara had two 
children with Renold, one of whom had died in 1974. R. 1341. 
5. Several weeks prior to their marriage, Lou and Barbara executed an Ante 
Nuptial 
Agreement dated March 25, 1976 (the "Ante Nuptial Agreement"). R. 1341. 
6. In the Ante Nuptial Agreement, Lou and Barbara acknowledged that they 
had separate children and had "acquired certain real and personal properties" prior to their 
marriage. R. 1341. 
7. Lou and Barbara agreed that the purpose of the Ante Nuptial Agreement 
was to "protect the interests of their heirs at law in and to the property acquired by the 
parties during their lives,. . . define and make definite the property interest of each of 
them with respect to the other's property, and . . . put into written form theii 
understanding with respect to the disposition of their respective properties . . . ." R. 
8 
1341. 
8. Accordingly, in paragraph 1 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement, Lou and 
Barbara agreed that "[i]n the event of the termination of this marriage by death or 
otherwise all of the real, personal or mixed property owned by each party prior to their 
marriage shall be the sole and separate property of him or her or their respective estates . . 
. ." R. 1341. 
9. In paragraph 5 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement, Lou and Barbara agreed that 
in the event of the death of one of them, "all property, whether real, personal or mixed, 
acquired by the parties shall go to the survivor." R. 1341-42. 
10. Paragraph 3 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement provides that in the event of 
Lou's death Barbara would have "the right to reside in the dwelling house of the parties 
for her lifetime, or such shorter time as she may elect however, in the event that she 
should remarry then she shall move therefrom within a reasonable time back to her own 
separate property." R. 1342. 
11. On September 29, 1978, Lou prepared a holographic will (the "Will"). On 
February 11, 1980, Lou prepared a Codicil to his Will (the "Codicil"). Lou's Will 
incorporating the Ante Nuptial Agreement and the Codicil were entered into probate on 
December 7, 1999. R. 1342. 
12. In his Will and Codicil, Lou directed that his estate be divided as follows: 
a. First, all debts, expenses and administration expenses are to be paid. 
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b. Then Lou left all of his property in equal shares to his daughters 
Brooke Mageras ("Brooke") and Allyson Uzelac ("Allyson"). 
c. Then Barbara was "to receive per terms our ante nuptml agreement 
dated March 25, 1976. . . . " 
d. Lou then made a $5,000 bequest to each of his granddetughters 
Angela Mageras ("Angela") and Amanda Mageras ("Amanda"). 
R. 1342. 
13. At the time of his marriage to Barbara, Lou owned certain real property, 
including two parcels located at 5561 and 5559 Highland Drive, Holladay, Utah, and six 
water shares in Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company. R. 1342. 
14. Barbara and Lou lived in the residence located on the 5559 and 5561 
Highland Drive properties (the "Residence") during their marriage. R. 1342-43. 
15. At the time of his marriage to Barbara, Louis held bank accounts in his 
name having a total value of $52,012.42. R. 1343. 
16. During his marriage to Barbara, Lou deposited all of his earnings and other 
monies he received in bank accounts held in his individual name. R. 1343. 
17. During her marriage to Lou, Barbara deposited all of the her mcome and 
monies received in bank accounts held in her name alone or in accounts held with her 
daughter from her previous marriage. R. 1343. 
18. Lou and Barbara each made various gifts of cash and property to their 
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separate children during the marriage. R. 1343. 
19. Lou died on November 6, 1999. He was survived by Barbara and his two 
children, Allyson and Brooke, and his granddaughters, Amanda and Angela. R. 1343. 
20. Joseph G. Uzelac, Lou's brother, was appointed personal representative of 
Lou's estate on December 7, 1999. R. 1343. 
21. At the time of his death, Lou held eight accounts at financial institutions 
having a total balance of $277,716.00. All but one of these accounts were in Loufs 
individual name. R. 1343. 
22. Of these accounts, four were "payable on death" ("POD") accounts having 
date of death balances totaling $201,839.15. Barbara was the death beneficiary on one 
account, which had a date of death balance of $12,790.00. The surviving death 
beneficiaries on the other accounts were Brooke and Allyson. R. 1343. 
23. Consequently, Lou's non-POD accounts held $75,876.85 on his date of 
death. R. 1343. 
24. At his death, Lou also owned certain stocks having a date of death value of 
$36,950.91, which he held in his individual name. R. 1344. 
25. Barbara has received $15,000 withdrawn from one of Lou's individual 
accounts prior to his death and deposited after Loufs death in a joint Zions bank account 
in Lou's and Barbara's names. She has also received the $4,858.83 held in the joint 
account prior to this deposit. R. 1344. 
U 
26. On Lou's death, Barbara received approximately $12,790 from the POD 
account in Lou's name on which she was designated death beneficiary. R. 1344. 
27. On May 31, 2003, the Personal Representative executed a Deed of 
Distribution whereby he transferred the property on which the Residence was located to 
Lou's daughters, subject to Barbara's life estate (the "Deed"). R. 1080. 
28. Barbara's life estate had a value at Lou's death of $307,090.00. Plaintiffs 
Trial Exhibit 3, Estate Tax Return, Schedule M, Page 27. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's interpretation of the Ante Nuptial Agreement should be affirmed 
because it is consistent with the parties' intent, the language of the entire agreement, the 
parties' course of conduct during their marriage, and Lou's Will. But even without 
reaching the issue of interpretation of the Ante Nuptial Agreement, the trial court's 
dismissal of Barbara's Complaint was proper because she failed to assert her claims 
within the one-year period for presenting a creditor claim. The trial court properly ruled 
that if Barbara was a creditor, her claim was barred by the one-year limitation period 
because she did not present a written claim to the Personal Representative or file her 
Complaint within this period. The trial court properly rejected Barbara's assertion that 
merely delivering a copy of the Ante Nuptial Agreement tothe Personal Representative at 
the original probate hearing constituted delivery of a written claim under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-804. Barbara's Complaint is wholly time-barred under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
803 and was therefore properly dismissed by the trial court. 
Likewise, the Deed transferring the remainder interest in two properties owned by 
Lou prior to the marriage to his children should stand, as affirmed in the trial court's 
September 29, 2003 Minute Entry. On appeal, Barbara has provided no legal basis to 
overturn the Deed under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-703. The Deed satisfied the Personal 
Representative's fiduciary duties, was in accordance with Lou's Will and the Ante Nuptial 
Agreement, and was not a conflict of interest transaction. Barbara's assertion that the 
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validity of the Deed is tied to the trial court's interpretation of paragraph 5 of the Ante 
Nuptial Agreement dealing with monies Lou earned during the marriage is incorrect. The 
Deed conveyed only property owned by Lou prior to the marriage, subject to Barbara's 
life estate. Thus the disposition under paragraph 5 of assets earned during the marriage 
has no bearing on the Deed. 
The trial court also properly rejected Barbara's interpretation of the ^uite Nuptial 
Agreement. Barbara's assertion that paragraph 5 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement, which 
awards all of the property "acquired by the parties" during the marriage to the survivor, 
entitles her to a distribution equal to the amount of Lou's earnings during the marriage, 
including gifts to Lou's daughters during the marriage and at his death, is not a reasonable 
interpretation of the Ante Nuptial Agreement. The parties, as evidenced by their intent 
set forth in Ante Nuptial Agreement, intended that the agreement preserve their separate 
assets acquired during their lives—including during the marriage—for their1 children. 
Only joint assets were to pass to the surviving spouse. The parties acted consistently with 
this intent during the marriage. They kept their separate earnings in separate accounts and 
made gifts to their separate children without objection by the other spouse. The Personal 
Representative has acted consistent with this intent. Barbara has received all of the assets 
Lou held jointly with her at his death, including approximately $19,858.83 held in a joint 
account and the $12,790 POD account upon which she was designated as Lou's death 
beneficiary. Under the Deed, the Personal Representative conveyed to Barbara the life 
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estate in the Residence set forth in paragraph 4 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement. The 
Personal Representative properly conveyed the remainder interest in this property to Lou's 
daughters—the beneficiaries who Barbara acknowledged in the Ante Nuptial Agreement 
were entitled to this property. 
Finally, Barbara's claim to the personal property located in the Residence and 
owned by Lou prior to the marriage is not properly before the Court of Appeals because 
Barbara has not objected to the trial court's procedure established to address the personal 
property. The trial court established a procedure in his April 6, 2004 Minute Entry by 
which the Personal Representative could waive any claim to the personal property. 
Barbara has not appealed this Minute Entry or objected to the procedure set forth in it. 
This issue is therefore not properly before the Court of Appeals, and Barbara's waiver 
arguments should be disregarded. 
Barbara has received property and assets worth almost $350,000 as a result of her 
husband's death. These distributions constitute all of the distributions to which Barbara is 
entitled under the Ante Nuptial Agreement. Barbara's late assertion of creditor status 
does not improve her claim—it further mandates its dismissal since Barbara, as a creditor, 
did not submit this claim within the one-year creditor claim period as required under Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-803. The Personal Representative's execution of the Deed was entirely 
consistent with both Lou's Will and the Ante Nuptial Agreement and the trial court 
therefore properly refused to disturb it. The trial court's ruling dismissing Barbara's 
15 
Complaint with prejudice should therefore should be affirmed and costs on appeal 
awarded to the Personal Representative. 
16 
ARGUMENT 
Barbara's brief on appeal contains two significant oversights that must be 
addressed as an initial matter. First, nowhere in her brief does Barbara disclose what it is 
she actually sought at trial. Barbara sought damages against Lou's estate in the amount of 
$293,320.09, based on her assertion that a provision in the parties' Ante Nuptial 
Agreement entitled her to a distribution upon Lou's death equal to all of the income he 
earned during the marriage. R. 1037. Barbara's claim therefore included the value of all 
bank accounts in Lou's individual name at his death, including $189,049.15 in POD 
accounts on which Lou's daughters were death beneficiaries, a $5,000 insurance 
obligation that the trial court had previously held Lou satisfied by creating a POD account 
for Barbara's benefit from which she received $12,790 at Lou's death, and $59,086.22 in 
gifts that Lou made during the marriage to his daughters. R. 1141. Barbara obscures the 
amount of her damages sought at trial because they reveal the unreasonableness of her 
interpretation of the Ante Nuptial Agreement. 
Second, throughout her brief Barbara falsely claims to have received virtually 
"nothing" from Lou's estate under the trial court's interpretation of the Ante Nuptial 
Agreement. Barbara's assertion that the trial court's interpretation would result in her 
taking nothing from Lou's estate is patently untrue. Under the trial court's interpretation, 
Barbara is entitled to, and has already received: a joint bank account holding $19,858.83, 
a POD account holding $12,790, and a life estate valued at more than $300,000. These 
17 
distributions are far from "nothing" and demonstrate the reasonableness of the trial court's 
interpretation. 
The trial court properly held that Barbara, if a creditor, failed to submit a proper 
creditor claim, either by written statement or Complaint, within the one-year creditor 
claim period. The trial court also properly upheld the Deed under Utah Code Ann. § 75-
3-703, and Barbara has provided no legal basis to challenge the trial court's ruling on this 
issue. The trial court's interpretation of the Ante Nuptial Agreement—under which 
Barbara received all properties owned by Lou and Barbara jointly at Lou's death—was 
proper because it followed the intent of the parties and the language of the entire Ante 
Nuptial Agreement. Finally, the issue of waiver is not properly before the Court of 
Appeals; Barbara does not challenge the trial court's procedure established 1o allow a 
waiver as to the personal property. Barbara's arguments on this issue should therefore be 
disregarded. 
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I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT IF BARBARA IS A 
CREDITOR, HER CLAIMS ARE TIME BARRED UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 75-3-803. 
Barbara seeks a distribution from Lou's estate under the Ante Nuptial Agreement 
referenced and incorporated in Lou's Will in addition to those she has already received. 
Shortly before trial, Barbara asserted for the first time that she was a creditor of the estate 
with a claim superior to those of the other beneficiaries. R. 923-25. She continued to 
assert her status as a creditor at trial. The trial court properly ruled at trial that Barbara, if 
a creditor, failed to present her claim within the one-year creditor claim period imposed 
under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803. R. 1343. Barbara's Complaint was filed over two 
years after Lou's death. R. 984-85. Her argument that simply providing a copy of the 
Ante Nuptial Agreement to the Personal Representative at the original probate hearing 
constituted adequate presentment under this statute fails under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
804, which sets forth the straightforward requirements for presentment of an adequate 
creditor claim. Barbara's delivery of the Ante Nuptial Agreement is entirely deficient 
under these requirements. Her Complaint is therefore time-barred and the trial court's 
dismissal of it should be affirmed. 
A. Barbara's Complaint is Time Barred Because it Was Filed Over a Year 
after the Deadline for Presentment of Creditor Claims Expired. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(3), a claim that arises after the death of the 
decedent is barred unless presented to the estate the later of three months after it arises or 
one year after the decedent's death. Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(3): 
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All claims against a decedent's estate that arise at or after the 
death of the decedent. . . whether due or 1o become due, 
absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on 
contract, tort, or other legal basis are barred against the estate, 
the personal representative and the heirs and devisees of the 
decedent unless presented as follows: . . ( b ) . . . within the 
later of three months after it arises, or the time specified in 
subsection 1(a).11 
Subsection 1(a) provides that creditor claims are barred one year after the decedent's 
death. Id. Barbara's claim to a distribution upon Lou's death under paragraph 5 of the 
Ante Nuptial Agreement arose at his death. Lou died on November 6, 1999, and 
Barbara's deadline to file a creditor claim ran on November 6, 2000. Barbara did not file 
the Complaint until February 4, 2002, over two years after Lou's death, and long after the 
creditor claim deadline expired. Barbara's Complaint is therefore time-barred under Utah 
Code Ann. §75-3-803. 
B. Merely Providing a Copy of the Ante Nuptial Agreement to the 
Personal Representative is Not Adequate Presentment of a Claim 
under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-804. 
The trial court properly denied Barbara's assertion that she presented a timely 
creditor claim by delivering a copy of the Ante Nuptial Agreement at the initial probate 
hearing. The Ante Nuptial Agreement does not satisfy the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-804. Barbara's assertion that this statute requires "only the delivery of . . . 'a 
written statement of the claim'ff misrepresents what the statute actually says. To 
constitute adequate delivery of a claim, the claimant must deliver or mail to the personal 
representative, or file with the probate court "a written statement of the claim indicating 
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its basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed." Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-804(l)(a) (emphasis added). Of these required elements, the Ante Nuptial 
Agreement includes at most Barbara's name. 
Likewise, Barbara's assertion that mere delivery of the Ante Nuptial Agreement 
satisfies the standard set forth in Quinn v. Quinn, 772 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1989)—the 
leading Utah case on the adequacy of notice of a creditor claim—is not supported by the 
case itself. In Quinn, 
the Court described the requirements for presentment of a creditor claim as follows. 
Utah's version of the Uniform Probate Code sets forth two 
methods of presenting claims to an estate. First, the claimant 
may "deliver or mail to the personal representative a written 
statement of the claim indicating its basis, the name and 
address of the claimant, and the amount claimed . . . . " Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-804(l)(a) (1978). Alternatively, the 
claimant may commence a court action against the personal 
representative of the estate. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-804(l)(b) 
(1978). 
Id at 980. 
The inadequacy of Barbara's delivery of the Ante Nuptial Agreement as 
presentment of a claim under sections 75-3-803 and -804 is clear when compared to the 
notice of the claim provided in Quinn. The claim presented in Quinn was described by 
the court as follows: 
Kip's written claim for $650,000 stated, with our emphasis, 
"The basis of this claim is that on or about May 24, 1984, 
Fenton G. Quinn caused the death ofDawana W. Quinn and 
that said action was done in a willful and malicious manner 
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with the premeditated attempt to cause the death ofDawana 
W. Quinn" It also stated that the exact amount of the claim 
"as a result of decedent's actions" would have to be 
determined at trial. 
Id. at 981 (emphasis in original). The claimant in Quinn provided a dollar amount for the 
claim and a description of the tort basis of the claim. The Ante Nuptial Agreement 
provides a set dollar figure only for the life insurance ($5,000.00). The Ante Nuptial 
Agreement could, as a contract, give rise to a breach of contract claim, but nothing in the 
document itself indicated that a breach or any other act giving rise to a cause of action 
had occurred. In addition, the claimant in Quinn provided notice that she was actually 
asserting a claim. In contrast, nothing about Barbara's delivery of the Ante Nuptial 
Agreement indicated she intended anything other than to provide a copy of the document 
referenced in the just-probated Will. The Personal Representative did not dispute the 
validity of the Ante Nuptial Agreement and has made distributions to Barbara under it. 
The Personal Representative therefore reasonably viewed the Ante Nuptial Agreement as 
addressing Barbara's beneficiary rights under the Will into which it was incorporated, and 
not as a creditor claim. 
Significantly, the Quinn Court held that a claimant must describe the claim 
sufficient to satisfy the "notice-pleading" standard for a complaint in order to provide 
adequate notice of a claim under the presentment requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 75-
3-804. "Under a notice-pleading standard, an adequate complaint is one that affords fair 
notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general indication of the type of 
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litigation involved." Quinn, 772 P.2d at 981 (citation and quotations omitted). The court 
therefore held that: 
[The] claim was sufficient for purposes of section 75-3-803 and section 75-
3-804(1 )(a) insofar as it gave [the personal representative] fair notice that 
the estate was facing a sizeable tort claim, that the basis of the $ 650,000 
claim was the death of Dawana at the hands of Fenton Glade, and that a 
trial would be necessary to fix the exact amount of liability if he decided not 
to approve or compromise the claim. [The] personal representativef] had 
those facts to take into account as he acted on all claims, thus furthering his 
speedy and efficient administration and distribution of the estate. Because 
he was adequately advised of the basis of this claim and the likely amount, 
he could make an informed decision concerning the effect his action on it 
would have on the administration of the estate as a whole. Sections 75-3-
803 and -804 should be applied to facilitate settlement of estates without 
unduly restricting the rights of timely claimants who in good faith endeavor 
to comply with the requirements of the statute. 
Id. at 981-82. Contrary to Barbara's assertion that merely delivering the Ante Nuptial 
Agreement satisfies Quinn, it is clear that under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an 
action commenced by merely filing and service of a copy of the Ante Nuptial Agreement 
would be deficient to state a claim for relief. "A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief. . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he 
deems himself to be entitled." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Ante Nuptial Agreement 
contains neither of these elements. It is therefore insufficient to present a creditor claim 
under Quinn. 
Under the clear terms of Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-803 and -804 and Quinn, the 
trial court correctly held that Barbara failed to make a timely presentment of her claim. 
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Barbara's Complaint is therefore wholly time-barred. The Court's April 6, 2004 Order 
may be affirmed, and Barbara's Complaint dismissed with prejudice, on this basis alone. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S APPROVAL OF THE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE'S DEED DISTRIBUTING TO LOU'S DAUGHTERS 
PROPERTY OWNED BY LOU PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE WAS 
PROPER UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-703. 
Barbara, without a single citation to any legal authority, asserts that the trial court's 
September 27, 2003 Minute Entry improperly denied her motion to set aside the Deed, by 
which the Personal Representative distributed to Lou's daughters (subject to Barbara's life 
estate) real property owned by Lou prior to his marriage. "A personal representative is 
under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the 
terms of any probated and effective will and [the Utah Probate Code] and as expeditiously 
and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of Ihe estate." Utah Code Ann. § 75-
3-703. Barbara asserts that the Deed "jeopardized her ability to obtain full compensation 
for damages she sought" and was therefore voidable under section 75-3-703. She also 
asserts that the fact that the Deed was consistent with "some of the terms of a will is not 
dispositive" of this issue. She does not indicate, however, what legal^principle she 
believes is dispositive of this issue. Instead, Barbara's sole support for this argument is 
her assertion that allowing a personal representative to distribute an asset of the estate 
consistent with the decedent's will would excuse all personal representatives from the 
duty to pay creditors. 
Barbara's assertion ignores the clear terms of section 75-3-703, which requires a 
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personal representative to balance the duties to distribute assets according to the 
decedent's will, administer the estate efficiently and expeditiously, and follow the dictates 
of the Utah Probate Code. The Utah Probate Code contains an entire chapter dealing with 
the presentment, litigation and payment of creditor claims. Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-801 
through -816. This procedure will not be disrupted by requiring a personal representative 
to follow the dictates of the deceased's will as required under section 75-3-703. Indeed, 
Barbara has not asserted that the Personal Representative failed to follow or ignored the 
creditor claim procedure. She has not asserted that the Deed was not in the estate's best 
interest, nor has she asserted that its execution increased the time or expense required to 
administer the estate. Barbara does not challenge to the Deed under the section 75-3-703 
factors2 except to state that the Deed was contrary to the direction in Lou's Will that 
distribution be made after "just debts, funeral expenses and expenses of administration are 
paid." She claims that the Personal Representative's execution of the Deed was therefore 
justified only if she had no valid creditor claim. This assertion fails, however, because it 
ignores the Ante Nuptial Agreement itself, the very document under which Barbara 
makes her putative creditor claim. Barbara asserts that her rights as a "creditor" under the 
Ante Nuptial Agreement foreclose execution of the Deed. Yet in paragraph 1 of the Ante 
Nuptial Agreement, Barbara explicitly agreed that she had no claim to Lou's property 
2The trial court also ruled that the Personal Representative's execution of the Deed 
was not a conflict of interest under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-712. R. 1082. Barbara does 
not challenge this ruling on appeal. 
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owned prior to the marriage. R. 1046.3 The Deed therefore follows both the dictates of 
the Ante Nuptial Agreement and Lou's Will. It preserved Barbara's life estate in the 
Residence, and conveyed to Lou's daughters only property to which Barbara agreed she 
had no claim under the Ante Nuptial Agreement. The trial court's September 27, 2003 
Minute Entry ruling that the Deed was in accordance with Lou's Will and Ulah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-703 was correct and should be affirmed.4 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF "ACQUIRED BY THE 
PARTIES" IS SUPPORTED BY THE PARTIES1 STATED INTENT AND 
UTAH LAW. 
The trial court correctly held that Barbara was entitled only to property owned 
jointly with Lou at his death—all of which has been distributed to her—and the trial court 
properly dismissed the Complaint on that basis. Barbara asserts that paragraph 5 of the 
3As a result, Barbara's assertion that reversal of the trial court's interpretation of the 
Ante Nuptial Agreement would mandate a reversal of the Minute Order approving the 
Deed overreaches. Even if Barbara were to prevail on her interpretation of paragraph 5 of 
the Ante Nuptial Agreement, this would entitle her to receive only property acquired 
during the marriage. Property owned by Lou prior to the marriage such as the real 
property conveyed via the Deed would still pass to his daughters under both Barbara's and 
the Personal Representative's interpretations of the paragraph 1 of the Ante Nuptial 
Agreement. 
furthermore, to the extent Barbara's claim seeks to assess property owned by Lou 
prior to the marriage for amounts passing through the POD accounts to his daughters, the 
trial court properly held in the September 27, 203 Minute Entry, and Barbara does not 
dispute on appeal, that Barbara's claim fails under Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-107. If 
Barbara wanted to recapture the amount of these POD account distributions, her remedy 
under this statute was to file a written demand on the Personal Representative within two 
years following Lou' death. Id. She failed to do so. R. 1081. 
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Ante Nuptial Agreement entitles her to a distribution equal to Lou's income earned during 
the marriage. This assertion is contrary to the parties' intent stated in the Ante Nuptial 
Agreement and evidenced by their conduct during the marriage. It would necessarily 
have the effect of requiring the Personal Representative to assess property owned by Lou 
prior to the marriage—which Barbara acknowledged in the Ante Nuptial Agreement 
passed to Lou's daughters—in order to fund a distribution to her. The Personal 
Representative has always followed an interpretation of the Ante Nuptial Agreement that 
is in accordance with the agreement's terms, the parties' stated intent and Lou's Will. The 
trial court therefore properly interpreted of the Ante Nuptial Agreement to find that 
Barbara was not entitled to distributions from the estate in addition to those that she had 
already received. 
A. The Trial Court's Interpretation of Paragraph 5 Gives Effect to All 
Terms of the Ante Nuptial Agreement. 
"The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the 
intentions of the parties to the contract." WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 
UT 88, f 15, 54 P.3d 1139. In interpreting the Ante Nuptial Agreement, the Court must 
"look to the writing itself to ascertain the parties' intentions," and must "consider each 
contract provision . . . in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to 
all and ignoring none." Id. at Tj 18. The trial courts interpretation of the Ante Nuptial 
Agreement is correct because it gives effect to the parties' intent stated in the agreement, 
all of the Ante Nuptial Agreement's provisions, and Lou's Will. 
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1. Recitals. The recitals to the Ante Nuptial Agreement clearly set out 
the parties' intentions with respect to their separate and joint property. When they 
married, Barbara was 49 and Lou 60. Each had been maimed previously and had children 
from their prior marriages. R. 1045. Both Barbara and Lou had already worked for most 
of their lives, and acquired significant assets during the course of their respective 
previous marriages. R. 1045. Thus Barbara and Lou were not like a typical young couple 
that marries with the intent of creating a family and acquiring a lifetime's worth of assets 
together. Instead, Barbara and Lou married at the end of their working lives. So they 
directed that the overriding purpose of the Ante Nuptial Agreement was "to protect the 
interests of their heirs at law in and to the property acquired by the respective parties 
during their lives." Ante Nuptial Agreement at 1. R. 1045. (emphasis added). Lou and 
Barbara signed the Ante Nuptial Agreement prior to their marriage, at which time their 
respective heirs were their separate children (and descendants). Thus Barbara and Lou 
explicitly established their intent to protect all of the property acquired by each of them, 
whether prior to or during the marriage, for their descendants. Had Barbara and Lou 
intended to protect only their separate children's interest in property owned prior to the 
marriage, this recital would have narrowly referred to protecting property acquired by the 
respective parties "prior to the marriage." Instead, it broadly refers to protecting all 
property acquired by each party "during their lives" for their separate children. 
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2. Paragraph 1. Paragraph 1 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement deals 
specifically with the disposition of each party's property owned prior to the marriage. 
Paragraph 1 provides that: 
In the event of the termination of this marriage by death or otherwise all of 
the real, personal or mixed property owned by each party hereto prior to the 
marriage shall be the sole and separate property of him and her or their 
respective estates and that each party hereto agrees to execute and deliver to 
the other or his estate a quit-claim deed in and to all real, personal or mixed 
property owned by him or her prior to the marriage. In the event that said 
quit-claim deeds are not executed this Agreement shall suffice as an 
adequate quitclaim deed for such purpose. 
Ante Nuptial Agreement 1 1 , R. 1046. This provision therefore provides that assets 
owned by each spouse prior to the marriage pass to his or her estate on death, and 
obligates the surviving spouse to execute a deed conveying any property held by the 
survivor that constitutes the deceased spouse's premarital property to the deceased's 
estate. This deed requirement helps to implement paragraph 9—which provides that 
premarital property that is converted into another form remains premarital property 
despite such conversion. This provision, by preserving each party's separate property 
owned prior to the marriage for his or her respective descendants or estates is entirely 
consistent with the Ante Nuptial Agreement's recital stating that the purpose of the 
agreement is to preserve each party's property acquired during his or her life for his or 
heirs. 
3. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. The meaning of these provisions was 
addressed by the trial court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. 
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Barbara's claims asserted under these provisions were dismissed. This dismissal included 
Barbara's claim for $5,000 in life insurance under paragraph 2, which the trial court 
dismissed on the basis that Lou satisfied this obligation by establishing the POD account 
from which Barbara received approximately $12,790 at Lou's death. Ante Nuptial 
Agreement <[fl[ 2, 3 and 4, R. 836-39. Barbara nevertheless continued to include the 
$5,000 life insurance payout in her damages asserted at trial. 
4. Paragraph 5. Paragraph 5 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement provides 
that on the death of the first spouse to die, property "acquired by the parties" would pass 
to the survivor. Ante Nuptial Agreement j^ 5, R. 1046-47. The trial court properly ruled 
that this provision, referring to assets acquired "by the parties," means that the survivor 
received any properties or assets that Lou and Barbara acquired together. On the face of 
the Ante Nuptial Agreement, it is apparent that Lou and Barbara meant the assets 
described in this paragraph to include joint assets only and not all of the deceased 
spouse's separate property. For instance, paragraph 1 clearly states that property owned 
by "each party" prior to the marriage would remain that person's "sole and separate" 
property or the property of "his or her" "respective estates." Thus Lou and Barbara were 
well able to describe and segregate property owned by them prior to their marriage, and 
were well able to describe themselves in their separate rather than joint capacity. Lou and 
Barbara, having previously specifically referred to property owned by the "respective 
parties," "each party" and their "respective estates" in paragraph 1, do not use these 
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individuating terms in paragraph 5. Instead, they refer to simply "the parties." Where 
Lou and Barbara previously referred to themselves as separate and distinct individuals 
with respect to assets that pass to their separate children, in paragraph 5 they refer to 
themselves only in their joint capacity when describing property that passes to the 
surviving spouse. 
The words that Barbara and Lou used in the Ante Nuptial Agreement had meaning. 
In Utah, antenuptial agreements are specifically subject to the fundamental rule of 
contract construction providing that ff[i]n interpreting contracts, the principal concern is to 
determine what the parties intended by what they said." Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 
1271, 1273 (Utah App. 1988) (emphasis added). When construing an ante nuptial 
agreement, a court "[cannot] add, ignore, or discard words in this process," but must 
"render certain the meaning of the provision . . . in dispute . . . by an objective and 
reasonable construction of the whole contract." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). 
Therefore, "[t]he ordinary and usual meaning of the words used is given effect, and effect 
is to be given the entire agreement without ignoring any part thereof." Id. (citations and 
quotations omitted). Under these rules of construction, the trial court correctly interpreted 
the different terms that Lou and Barbara used in the Ante Nuptial Agreement to describe 
themselves and their property individually and jointly as having different meanings. 
Furthermore, granting to the survivor only the parties' property acquired jointly during the 
marriage is consistent with the recital that the Ante Nuptial Agreement's purpose was to 
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preserve each party's separate property for his or her separate heirs. 
5. Paragraph 6. Paragraph 6 states that paragraph 5, under which 
assets acquired by the parties during the marriage pass to the survivor, is subject to 
paragraph 9, which preserves the pre-marital character of assets that a party converts to 
another form during the marriage. Ante Nuptial Agreement f^ 6, R. 1047. This paragraph 
further evidences the Ante Nuptial Agreement's primary intent to preserve each party's 
assets for his or her descendants, by ensuring that the proceeds or replacement property 
arising from a premarital asset held by a party pass to his or her descendants rather than 
the surviving spouse under paragraph 5. 
6. Paragraph 7. Paragraph 7 provides that if Lou and Barbara were to 
die simultaneously, Lou's property owned prior to the marriage would be divided equally 
among his "heirs at law" and Barbara's property owned prior to the marriage would be 
divided equally among her "heirs at law." Ante Nuptial Agreement j^ 7; R. 1047. This 
provision is entirely in line with the provision of paragraph 1 stating that if one spouse 
dies before the other, his or her property owned prior to the marriage passes to his or her 
separate children. This provision is also consistent with the agreement's recital stating 
that the agreement's purpose was to preserve each party's separate property earned during 
his or her life for his or her heirs at law. 
7. Paragraph 8. Paragraph 8 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement deals 
with the distribution of the property "acquired by them during the marriage" if Lou and 
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Barbara were to die simultaneously. This clause provides that such property be divided 
equally between their estates.5 Ante Nuptial Agreement % 8, R. 1047. Barbara incorrectly 
asserts that the trial court's interpretation of paragraph 5 to grant only the parties'jointly 
held property to the survivor is in conflict with this provision. If Barbara were entitled to 
all of the parties' joint property on Lou's death, and Lou were entitled to all of the parties' 
joint property on his death, and both were to die simultaneously, the cumulative and net 
effect would be to divide the parties' jointly held property between their estates equally. 
Thus this provision is entirely consistent with the trial court's interpretation of paragraph 
5. 
8. Paragraph 9. Paragraph 9 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement provides 
that if a party sells, converts or exchanges an asset owned prior to the marriage, the 
replacement asset or proceeds will be deemed property owned prior to the marriage and, 
as clarified in paragraph 6, will pass to the party's descendants under paragraph 1 rather 
than to the surviving spouse under paragraph 5. Ante Nuptial Agreement ^ 9, R. 1047. 
Barbara asserts that paragraph 9 is unnecessary under the trial court's interpretation of 
5The cases cited by Barbara in her discussion of paragraphs 7 and 8 for the 
proposition that "acquired by the parties" means "an acquisition by the husband, the wife 
or both," are divorce cases that address only the narrow issue of whether a particular asset 
was acquired during the marriage and therefore subject to division in the-divorce. 
Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 837 (Utah App. 1995) (dealingjwith whether growth 
in husband's 401(k) was property acquired during the marriage); Elman v. Elman, 2002 
UT App 83, 45 P.3d 176 (addressing whether wife should be awarded portion of 
appreciation of husband's separate partnership interest). 
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paragraph 5. However, under the trial court's interpretation, paragraph 9 is needed 
precisely to distinguish between two types of property: the property that Lou and Barbara 
acquired jointly during the marriage with their earnings during the marriage—which 
passes to the survivor under paragraph 5, and any property they commingled or acquired 
together during the marriage with assets they owned prior to the marriage—which passes 
to the deceased's descendants under paragraph 1. In addition, as tliroughout the rest of the 
Ante Nuptial Agreement, in this paragraph, when Lou and Barbara are dealing with 
property owned by them separately prior to their marriage that passes to their separate 
descendants, the agreement uses the individuating phrase "either party" rather than 
referring to Lou and Barbara jointly as "the parties," further evidencing Lou's and 
Barbara's intent that only property acquired by them jointly during the marriage was to 
pass to the surviving spouse under paragraph 5. 
The trial court's interpretation of the Ante Nuptial Agreement gives effect to all of 
its provisions, as well as the parties' intent stated therein, and should be affirmed. 
B. Barbara's Interpretation is Directly Contrary to the Parties' Stated 
Intent. 
In contrast to the trial court's harmonizing interpretation of the Ante Nuptial 
Agreement, Barbara's interpretation of the Ante Nuptial would vitiate the entire purpose 
of the Ante Nuptial Agreement itself The parties clearly intended, in their own words, 
for the Ante Nuptial Agreement to protect the interest of their respective children in the 
property each party acquired "during their lives." Under Barbara's interpretation, 
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paragraph 5 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement would have the effect of destroying this 
interest rather than protecting it. Under the well-settled rules of contract construction, the 
I 
Ante Nuptial Agreement must be interpreted according to the parties' stated intent. 
WebBank, 2002 UT 88 at f^ 11. Lou's stated intent in the Ante Nuptial Agreement was to 
preserve the assets acquired during his life—which included the period of his marriage to 
Barbara—for his children. 
Barbara's asserted interpretation would negate both this stated intent and 
paragraph 1 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement, in violation of the rule of contract 
construction that "[provisions which are apparently conflicting are to be reconciled and 
harmonized, if possible, by reasonable interpretation so that the entire agreement can be 
given effect." Munfordv. Lee Servicing Co,, 2000 UT App. 108 *{ 18, 999 P.2d 23 
(quotation and citation omitted). During his marriage to Barbara, Lou received a survivor 
annuity under Ruth's pension, he received payments for his business sold prior to the 
marriage, he earned wages, and, when he retired, he received social security payments. R. 
1413. Transcript of Bench Trial, October 7, 2003 ("Trial Transcript") at 98:13-15, 99:21-
23. During their 23-year marriage, Lou spent his earnings on his and Barbara's living 
expenses, and made gifts to his daughters. Trial Transcript at 66:19-24, 87:23-25, 88:1-7. 
Yet Barbara's interpretation of paragraph 5 would require distribution to her of all of 
Lou's earnings, even if Lou no longer held these earnings at his death, including 
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$59,086.22 in gifts he made to his daughters during the marriage.6 Therefore, to satisfy a 
bequest under Barbara's theory, the Personal Representative necessarily would have to go 
beyond the probate assets to satisfy the distribution, and the only place he could look is to 
assets previously gifted to Lou's daughters or assets that pass to his daughters under 
paragraph 1 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement. Indeed, Barbara's claim includes the amount 
of Lou's POD accounts on which his daughters were death beneficiaries, it includes the 
amount of gifts that Lou made to his daughters during the marriage, and it seeks to set 
aside the Deed transferring to Lou's daughters their remainder interest in real property 
that Lou owned prior to the marriage, which clearly passes to Lou's daughters under 
paragraph 1 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement. R. 1046. Barbara therefore asks the Court 
to infer that Lou intended her entitlements under paragraph 5 to cut into the distribution to 
his daughters under paragraph 1 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement, without providing any 
legal basis whatsoever for such an inference. 
In fact, this inference is contrary to the longstanding principle of construction that 
"[a]n absolute testamentary gift to a first taker cannot be cut down by subsequent 
inconsistent language of doubtful or ambiguous significance." 80 Am. Jur. 2d WILLS § 
1261 (1981). "Before such a result will be permitted, the language indicating an intention 
6Barbara bases this figure on gifts over $100, although she provides no rationale 
for this threshold under the Ante Nuptial Agreement. R. 1139-40. Adoption of Barbara's 
interpretation would therefore require an inference that the parties intended a $100 gift 
"exemption." There is absolutely nothing in the Ante Nuptial Agreement or the record to 
support such an inference. The trial court therefore properly declined to make it. 
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to cut down the gift must be as clear, plain and unequivocal as that used in the gift itself." 
Id. Thus in order to demonstrate that she is entitled to a distribution that would cut into 
the share of Lou's children under paragraph 1, Barbara must establish that paragraph 5 
clearly, plainly and unequivocally intends this result. 
Barbara did not meet this burden at trial, because her interpretation is grossly 
inconsistent with the stated terms and intent of the Ante Nuptial Agreement. The Ante 
Nuptial Agreement says absolutely nothing at all about making a payment to Barbara 
equal to Lou's earnings during the marriage. To find for Barbara, the trial court would 
have been forced to read this requirement into the Ante Nuptial Agreement and Lou's 
Will, an invitation it properly declined. "The rule of construction that the intent of the 
testator must be carried out does not authorize courts to make a new will to conform to 
what they think the testator intended, but the intent of the testator must be ascertained 
from the will as it stands." In re Estate of Hunt, 842 P.2d 872, 874 (Utah 1992). 
Likewise, an interpretation cannot be adopted when there is "absolutely nothing in the 
will that can justify [the party's] contention," and "[i]ngenius conjecture would have to be 
indulged in if we were to hold with [the party]." Id. Thus "in ascertaining the intent of 
the testator, [the court] is limited to what he had written," and should "reject" a party's 
"invitation to find by implication what we thought would have been the testator's desire 
had he expressed it in the will." Id. Contrary to this well-settled precedent, Barbara 
asserts an interpretation of the Ante Nuptial Agreement that would vitiate the parties' 
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stated intent, and which favors conjecture and implication over what is actually said in the 
Ante Nuptial Agreement. The Court of Appeals should instead affirm the trial court's 
interpretation, which is consistent with the intent of the parties and the actual provisions 
of the Ante Nuptial Agreement. 
C. Barbara's Interpretation is Not Supported by the Record. 
Barbara asserts that the trial court's interpretation of the Ante Nuptial Agreement 
leaves her with "essentially nothing," and is unreasonable given that she "gave up a 
valuable right to a $325.00 annuity during the marriage in return for the promise 
contained in paragraph 5." Appellant's Brief at 12. Barbara provides no record cite for 
either contention. The Court of Appeals "need not, and will not, consider any facts not 
properly cited to, or supported by, the record." Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 
588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). In fact, the record demonstrates that both contentions are 
untrue. Barbara received distributions and property valued at almost $350,000 under the 
Ante Nuptial Agreement. R. 789; Trial Transcript at 100:5-17, 101:24-25, 102:1-17, 
104:13-25, 105:1-2, 107:11-15. This is far from "essentially nothing."7 Likewise, the 
7Barbara's characterization that she received "essentially nothing" appears intended 
to bring her claim under the purview of Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, 994 P.2d 193, a case 
she relied on extensively in her pre- and post-trial briefs (R. 1036, 1139-40. In particular, 
Barbara relied on Peirce below to support her contention that she should be awarded the 
total amount of gifts over $100 that Lou made to his daughters during the marriage. R. 
1139-40. Peirce reveals the deficiencies in Barbara's asserted interpretation. In Peirce, 
the parties entered a post nuptial agreement under which Mr. Peirce promised Mrs. Peirce 
that if she would give him every paycheck she earned thereafter during the marriage (less 
a small amount of spending money for her personal use), he would name her as the sole 
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record reveals that Barbara did not trade her annuity rights for her benefits under the Ante 
Nuptial Agreement. The annuity Barbara refers to was a Federal civil service survivor's 
annuity Barbara received as a result of the death of her first husband, who was a federal 
employee. R. 654-55, 1005. The annuity ceased when Barbara married Lou because 
under the terms of the Federal civil service annuity plan, a survivor's annuity was 
suspended for a surviving spouse if she remarried prior to age 60. R. 654-55, 1005. Thus 
Barbara did not "give up" the survivor annuity in order to receive benefits under the Ante 
Nuptial Agreement. The annuity would have been suspended if Lou and Barbara had 
never entered into the Ante Nuptial Agreement at all. When Lou died, the annuity 
resumed, as per the terms of the annuity plan. R. 654-55; Trial Transcript at 36:20-25. 
beneficiary of his estate. Peirce, 2000 UT 7 at f^ 3. During the 16-year marriage, Mr. 
Peirce was largely unemployed, while Mrs. Peirce supported the family by working in a 
coal mine. Peirce, 2000 UT 7 at f 2. Several years later, and less than two months prior 
to his death, Mr. Peirce moved in with his nephew and his nephew's wife. During this 
two-month period, Mr. Peirce gave away a substantial portion of his estate in numerous 
conveyances to his nephew, his nephew's wife, and others. Peirce, 2000 UT 7 at \ 4. In 
contrast, Barbara did not promise to turn over her separate earnings to Lou. In fact, she 
kept her earnings and assets strictly separate from Lou. R. 1343. Barbara was not Lou's 
source of financial support during the marriage. Each party worked and had separate 
earnings, investments and assets. R. 1342-43. Trial Transcript at 94:35, 95:1-15, 96:4-
25, 97:1-3. Lou did not give away a substantial part of his estate to someone other than 
Barbara shortly prior to his death. In fact, the only gift made to anyone shortly before 
Lou's death was the $15,000 check to Barbara that she deposited shortly after Lou's 
death. R. 1344. And unlike the widow in Peirce, Lou's gifts to his daughters did not 
dissipate his estate or negate the possibility of distributions to Barbara—Barbara's 
testimony at trial established that as a result of Lou's death she has received cash and 
property of almost $350,000. Trial Transcript at 100: 5-17, 101:24-25, 102:1-17, 104:3-
25, 105:1-2, 107:11-15. Thus the trial court's refusal to rely on Peirce as supporting 
Barbara's interpretation was proper. 
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In addition, Barbara also claims that her interpretation is reasonable and the trial 
court's unreasonable because her interpretation "rewards the survivor of a marriage of 
substantial length with an increasing share of the decedent's estate." Appellant's Brief at 
13. Thus she asserts that her interpretation should be adopted because it "compensates] a 
party for being loyal to the end of a long term marriage." Id. Barbara provides not one 
citation to any legal authority for this contention, nor can she point to anything in the 
Ante Nuptial Agreement, Lou's Will or the record that supports it. The Ante Nuptial 
Agreement says nothing about rewarding one spouse for staying married to the other or 
compensating a spouse for the length of the marriage. Instead, it says that Lou and 
Barbara intended by the agreement to preserve their separate assets acquired "during their 
lives" for their descendants. "In interpreting contracts, the principal concern is to 
determine what the parties intended by what they said." Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d dX 
1273 (emphasis added). Barbara's conjecture as to what other ante nuptial agreements 
might say is irrelevant, because the issue here is the meaning of this one. In this Ante 
Nuptial Agreement, the parties clearly stated their intent to preserve their separate assets 
for their children. Barbara's interpretation is wholly unsupported by the record and the 
trial court correctly declined to adopt it. 
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D. The Trial Court's Interpretation is Consistent with Loufs and 
Barbara's Conduct During the Marriage 
The trial court's interpretation of paragraph 5 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement is 
proper because it is consistent with the parties' intent demonstrated during their marriage. 
The Personal Representative demonstrated at trial that Lou and Barbara intended to 
preserve their separate assets and earnings for their descendants unless they purposely 
commingled them. Barbara's trial testimony established that during the marriage Lou 
deposited all of his earnings in bank accounts opened in his name only. Trial Transcript at 
66:5-15. Lou's stocks were held in his name only. R. 1007-08. Lou made frequent gifts 
to his children throughout the marriage. Trial Transcript at 97:23-25, 98:1-6. Barbara's 
course of performance under the Ante Nuptial Agreement is even more telling. She 
testified that she deposited all of her earnings and income during the marriage in separate 
accounts opened in her name only (or in her name and her daughter's name). Trial 
Transcript at 65:6, 92:1-3, 96:4-25. She made frequent gifts to her daughter from her 
separate earnings but did not consider herself in violation of the Ante Nuptial Agreement. 
Trial Transcript at 97:6-22. Neither Lou nor Barbara acted like they intended their 
separate earnings to be jointly acquired assets under paragraph 5 of the Ante Nuptial 
Agreement. Had they so intended, they would have deposited their earnings in joint 
accounts and paid the household expenses from those accounts. But instead Lou and 
Barbara very carefully kept their earnings separate. Barbara knew that she and Lou kept 
their earnings separate, and, with the exception of the joint Zions Bank account in 
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Barbara's possession, they held all of their monies in separate bank accounts at Lou's 
death. Trial Transcript at 65:6-17, 66:5-15. The parties' course of conduct during the 
marriage therefore supports the trial court's interpretation of paragraph 5. 
E. The Trial Court's Interpretation is Consistent with Lou's Will. 
In addition to the parties' intent stated in the Ante Nuptial Agreement and 
demonstrated throughout their marriage, Lou's intent to distribute his separate property to 
his children is clearly borne out in his Will, where he states that distributions should be 
made in the following order: 
(1) first, payment of debts, administrative and funeral expenses; 
(2) then, "all of my property, real, personal and mixed" passes to his daughters; 
(3) then Barbara receives her entitlements under the Ante Nuptial Agreement; 
and 
(4) then Lou's granddaughters Amanda and Angela receive a distribution of 
$5,000 each. 
As with contracts, "[t]he paramount objective in interpreting a will is to give effect 
to the intent and desire of the testator." In re Wallich, 420 P.2d 40, 42 (Utah 1966). A 
will should therefore be read "as a whole, and meaning given to all of its provisions 
considered in their relationship to each other." Id. Under this rule of construction, as 
with the Ante Nuptial Agreement, Lou's Will must be construed to give effect to each of 
his bequests in relation to each other. Lou intended that the distribution of "all my 
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property" to his daughters would take place before the distribution to Barbara under the 
Ante Nuptial Agreement. Likewise, Lou's and Barbara's children are first takers under 
paragraph 1 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement, followed later by the surviving spouse under 
paragraph 5. Under the first taker rule, Lou's and Barbara's separate children are 
therefore "presumed to be the favorite of the testator" under the Ante Nuptial Agreement. 
80 Am. Jur. 2d WILLS § 1261. This is carried through in Lou's Will, where he designates 
his children as first takers of "all my property" with priority over the distribution to 
Barbara. Lou therefore clearly set out his intent in the Will that the distribution to 
Barbara under the Ante Nuptial Agreement not cut into the distribution of "all my 
property" to his children under the Will. Yet by incorporating Barbara's entitlements 
under the Ante Nuptial Agreement into his Will, Lou also demonstrated his intent that the 
distribution of "all my property" to his children would not deprive Barbara of a 
distribution under the Ante Nuptial Agreement. Lou described and ordered his bequests 
this way for a reason, to which the trial court gave effect. The only way Lou's intent 
could be carried out is if the assets Lou intended to pass to Barbara were held jointly with 
her and therefore distinct from Lou's separate property that passes to his daughters. The 
trial court's interpretation of the Ante Nuptial Agreement is therefore correct as being 
consistent with Lou's Will. 
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IV. THE ISSUE OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES WAIVER OF 
RIGHTS IN THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE 
THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
Barbara's argument that the trial court incorrectly failed to recognize the Personal 
Representative's waiver of personal property rights fails because it is not properly before 
the Court of Appeals. The issue of whether the Personal Representative had waived the 
estate's rights to Lou's personal property owned prior to the marriage arose as a result of 
the Personal Representative's desire to facilitate settlement negotiations between Barbara 
and Lou's daughters ongoing at the time of trial as to the personal property. Trial 
Transcript at 139:21-25, 146:1-4. The Personal Representative therefore asserted that 
while the personal property was not included in Barbara's life estate under Lftah law and 
belonged to the estate, the Personal Representative would be willing to release his claim 
to all but certain items requested by Lou's daughters and testified 1o at trial. Trial 
Transcript at 139:21-25, 140:1-8. Following trial, the trial court issued to two rulings on 
the personal property. First, in the April 6, 2004 order the trial court ruled that as a matter 
of law Lou's life estate in the residence granted to Barbara did not include the personal 
property. R. 1346. In response to Barbara's objection that the personal property should 
be awarded to her under her waiver theory, the trial court dealt directly with the issue of 
whether and what the Personal Representative waived as to personal property in the 
Residence in its separate April 6, 2004 minute entry, in which it directed the Personal 
Representative to file a written waiver as to any personal property to which he waived a 
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claim. R. 1349. 
Barbara has not appealed the minute entry nor does she object to the procedure 
established by the trial court in it. Instead, she raises an assortment of irrelevant issues 
about waiver of criminal rights, writs of replevin and conversion, none of which were 
raised below.8 Absent a showing of plain error or exceptional circumstances—neither of 
which Barbara has asserted—'"issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time 
on appeal.'" Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah, 1996) (quoting State v. 
Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)). Barbara also fails to provide any analysis of 
how these issues or the cases cited to support them are relevant to the issues on appeal. 
Under Utah R. App. P. 24, "[b]riefs must contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant 
legal authority. An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is 
so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." State 
v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, 72 \ 13, 72 P.3d 138. "Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not 
Barbara's assertion that the Personal Representative had the burden of establishing 
which items of personal property Barbara should deliver is legally and factually incorrect. 
The trial court ruled that Lou's personal property owned prior to the marriage did not pass 
to Barbara under the life estate. Therefore, this property always belonged to the estate. 
The Personal Representative did not have to make claim to property that the estate already 
owned. If Barbara wanted to claim any of the personal property, she had the burden to 
identify which items she made claim to. Barbara's replevin and vagueness arguments also 
fail for this reason. Any vagueness in the description of the personal property as between 
what Barbara wanted and what Lou's daughters wanted is a deficiency in Barbara's claim 
to the property. Finally, any issues as to whether the tools were adequately described 
would again be deficiencies in Barbara's claim, and would in any event be resolved by the 
trial court's written waiver procedure, which Barbara has not objected to on appeal. 
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just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis 
based on that authority. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Barbara's bare 
references to legal theories not raised below do not meet this standard. More importantly, 
the trial court addressed Barbara's waiver concerns in the April 6, 2004 Minute Entry, to 
which Barbara has not objected. Barbara's waiver argument is therefore not properly 
before the Court of Appeals and should be disregarded. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly ruled that Barbara, if a creditor of the estate, failed to bring 
her claims within the one-year period imposed under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803. The 
trial court's dismissal of Barbara's complaint may therefore be affirmed on this basis 
alone. The trial court also properly affirmed the Personal Representative's execution of 
the Deed because the Deed was authorized under the Ante Nuptial Agreement and Lou's 
Will and was not a violation of fiduciary duty or a conflict of interest under the Utah 
Probate Code. The trial court's interpretation of paragraph 5 of the Ante Nuptial 
Agreement should be affirmed because it is consistent with the entire agreement's terms, 
the parties' intent stated in the agreement, their course of performance during the marriage 
and Lou's Will. Finally, the trial court established a procedure to address Barbara's 
waiver contention below. Barbara has not objected to this procedure nor has she provided 
any legal basis to overturn it. All of Barbara's claims therefore fail and the trial court's 
order dismissing her Complaint with prejudice should be affirmed and costs on appeal 
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awarded to the Personal Representative. 
DATED this H day of August, 2004. 
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